Just as it is difficult to typify the size and buildings of an agricultural village, the cultivated lands of a village are held in different ways, and the mode of land tenure varies from locale to locale. The distinction between tapu, "registered land," and amiriya, "state land," might be remembered, for it is often the subject of bitter quarrels between government and chieftains, the latter holding that certain lands classified as amiriya had "belonged" to their village or to their tribe for generations. Aside from this conflict between official and owner, there are villages which "own" their lands completely, others which can lay claim to only a part, and still others which are entirely owned, houses and lands together, by wealthy landlords, many of whom are absentees. The preferential conversion of surplus wealth into real estate has been noted, and the owners of village lands may range from tribal chieftains and persons of great fortune to relatively poor merchants or clerks who have invested their savings in a small plot for the inheritance and support of their sons. Thus the Rowanduz district has a great number of villagers who are tenants and, while in no sense bound to the soil as serfs, have a relationship with their landlords which, in its exchange of obligations and courtesies, can often resemble that between patron and client in the early days of the Roman Republic. Sadiq Agha, who lives in a house in Rowanduz, "owns" the village of Shaytina, leaving its immediate supervision to a sort of bailiff or overseer, one of the prominent villagers, who is termed the mukhtar,

although he has nothing to do with the office of mukhtar described in the preceding pages. Sadiq Agha holds a registered title to the land and pays the village's taxes to the government. In return, through his bailiff, he lays claim to a certain percentage, about a third, of the village's crops. Whenever he visits the village he is treated with great courtesy and with feasting. Now and then one sees a villager or bailiff kissing the hand of a visiting overlord, a servile usage which is generally looked down upon today. On the other hand, a village-owner is sought by his tenants in a thousand and one minor matters, a loan, a quarrel, a son to be recruited, and the like. A more exact description of these reciprocal duties will follow. 423 427 [576]

The villagers and kotchir fashion almost nothing which has retail value outside of the district itself, and, as will be seen more completely with reference to Rowanduz, indigenous crafts are simple and few in number. Coarse woolen cloth is woven in small square pieces, about eight inches on a side, and stitched together into long rolls, but this material is wholly used in the fabrication of local garments. Two Nestorian weavers and their wives work in a shop in the upper part of the town of Rowanduz, the only craftsmen of their religion laboring in the community. Their wooden loom stands upright, and a hole has been dug into the earthen floor beneath it to accommodate the weaver's legs. The shop contains a curious old wooden spinning wheel, although the women preferred the more familiar spindle and 286 [294] 283 286

pilgrimage to Mecca, an expensive undertaking for the people of Rowanduz. 788

A more precise idea of the actual sums involved may be obtained from the example of a general merchant, Fatah-Ullah, who, while not in the class of the wholesalers, is wealthier than some of his fellow merchants, and most other shopkeepers and craftsmen in the town. Fatah-Ullah keeps a small general shop in the bazar from which he obtains about 250 fils a day, and owns a house in which he rents two rooms, in 1951 to a police constable and a teacher, for a total of 4 dinars a month. In addition he has a contract with the serai to furnish prisoners in its jail with bread and stew, at about 60 fils for each head, and there are always four or five prisoners on hand. Fatah-Ullah's wife bakes bread, which is peddled about the town by some of his children, realizing about 200 fils every day. His gross income for a year may be estimated as follows:

(1000 fils : 1 Iraqi Dinar : $2.80)

	Per diem	Per mensem	Per annum
Shop	250 fils	6.250 dinars	75.000 dinars
Rental	-	4.000 dinars	48.000 dinars
Contract	200 fils	5.000 dinars	60.000 dinars
Bread	200 fils	5.000 dinars	60.000 dinars
		20.250 dinars ($56.70)	243.000 dinars ($680.40)

Against this, Fatah-Ullah has a large number of expenditures. He must, of course, purchase the merchandise for his shop, and flour and vegetables for baking and the prison contract. In addition, he must buy food and clothing for himself and his family (he has seven

wealthy widow, never lives alone, and rarely remains unmarried for any length of time. It would be virtually impossible for her to have an unmarried man in her service in the face of popular opinion. It is much the same with a bachelor living alone, for the townspeople would never countenance his engaging a maid, even if he could find one. The same holds true of an unmarried person living with a family to which he is not related. The investigator lived for a time with the family of a merchant, superficially separated from them by a wall of blankets, and a certain segment of neighborhood opinion let it be known that this householder had sacrificed the honor of his family for the sum of the rental. The merchant informed the investigator that he was convinced that the latter, as a gentleman, had no evil intention toward his womenfolk and that the veil of blanketing was for "the neighbors" rather than any practical purpose of segregation. This, incidentally, provided him with an excuse for charging a slightly higher amount than necessary. It is also interesting that, after the rooms had been engaged, several invitations were received, accompanied by expostulations, to stay as a guest with other families, deferred until this time. Almost all of those unmarried, the teachers and lesser officials, must hire houses and male servants of their own. There are a few exceptions. The <u>qaimmaqam</u>, unaccompanied by his wife, lived alone, and had several persons, including a widow, in his service. The superiority of his position, coupled with the fact that he was already married,

357 589 123 589 [208] [427] [554] 589 427 592 357 554

4: Hansen E-5 (1957) 1961 MA11 Kurd MA11



Fig. 13. Village houses built up the slope. Topzawa.

owner of the village leased the ground to his farmers and none could sell, move away or move in without his sanction[68]. Tenants owned their cattle, their implements and the only part of the house construction that was of value, the big poplar trunks that were used as rafters.

According to information obtained through my interpreter, tenants handed over 50% of the tobacco crop and 10% of all other crops, besides ploughing, harvesting and threshing for the village owner[69]. On another occasion the interpreter gave the amount as 50% of both wheat and tobacco. However this information must be taken with reserve. Edmonds[70] gives 10% of the winter crop—wheat and barley—plus fees for grazing, butter and eggs. Leach[71] states 50% if the tenant himself supplies the seeds and possesses agricultural implements, but 75% if the owner of the village has to supply these.

During the British mandate period, 1918–1932, the Land Settlement Commission was established as "a court of claims relating to questions of land tenure" in connexion with a "comprehensive program" of surveying for the purpose of covering systematically all cultivated land and finally "settle and register proprietory rights"[72]. A representative of this commission held a meeting with farmers in the sheikh's courtyard at Serkan during my stay there.

7: Barth E-5 (1951) 1953 MA11 Kurd MA11

he himself is considered a tenant farmer — the land belonging to an absentee landowner, a tribal chief, or some privileged section of the local community. The typical situation is for the freeholding farmers to have retained what is generally called *tribal* organization (see below), whereas the tenant farmer has no clear political affiliation, but is largely subject to the control of the landowner. This dichotomy between the tribal, freeholding farmer and the tenant, more or less dependent on a capitalist for land and other privileges, is basic to much of the following discussion. The dichotomy is clearly made by Kurds themselves, and is associated with the co-variance of other institutional forms.

The characteristic tendency on the land which does not directly belong to the farmer who is using it, is a progressive delegation of rights. This influences the division of labor and the form of work-gangs in the fields, and reinforces class differences.

In the tribal village, each farmer generally works his own fields with own equipment, or may hire some outside labor to assist him at certain times of year. Mutual borrowing, or renting, of livestock may be resorted to. The grazing area belongs to the village as a whole, and herding the animals is generally delegated to one or more full-time shepherds of low status, who may serve the whole village.

The land of the typical tenant village belongs to an absentee landowner, who collects 1/10—1/5 of the cereal crop by right. The old residents of the village have informal inherited right of use of certain fields. These are not inalienable. Any person needing more land may apply to the landowner, and if he can demonstrate that he is able to use more, he will be allotted fallow land that formerly belonged to other households. Where no fallow land is available and the need is great, e. g. due to increase in the size of a given family, any type of land may be transferred. Theoretically, the landowner has the right to evict any one for any reason — though this is a power he rarely exercises, since it generally precipitates conflicts and disrupts village unity.

Not infrequently, the more well-to-do tenant farmer will in fact do no farming himself, but will hire labor in his fields for a share of the crop, or other payments. Such payments are traditionally

stipulated, e. g. for reaping 1/6 of the wheat crop, 1/3 of barley for plowing, food plus 100 fils/day (= 2 shillings) or 150 fils/day and no food.

The large landowner may rent out the rigths to a certain village or area for a limited period of time to some intermediary capitalist for a small fee plus 1/2 of the intermediary capitalist's profits. This intermediary is then free to stipulate the share of the tenants' crop he wishes to collect as rent for the year. The number of non-productive links in the chain from the laborer on the fields to the ultimate landowner may thus become quite considerable, and the



Diagram No. 1. Shares in division of a cereal crop.

division of the crop might be as illustrated in Diagram 1. More frequently, however, the intermediary capitalist is missing in the hierarchy, and the landowner, collecting direct from his tenants, is content with the smaller, traditional share of 1/3 of the crop on un-irrigated land.

At harvest time, a characteristic work-gang in the grainfields of a tenant village will consequently consist of 5—10 men, in part made up of migratory labor, cutting the grain, and young women carrying it to the threshing place. Threshing and winnowing, on the other hand, are generally the work of only two men; plowing is usually a solitary occupation.

Attending to the irrigation of the tobacco-fields usually follows a different pattern. The various farmers who share a certain watering system either tend it each in turn, or one man among them may take on the major responsibility.

he owns several as in the case of Sheikh Mohammad Agha of Walash or Hamid Amin Beg of Dergala, he will live in one himself and appoint headmen (kukha) as his agents in the other villages. In theory the Agha is the absolute owner of all the land in the gund, the villagers occupy and cultivate the land in the capacity of tenants and in return pay him, in theory at any rate, the seemingly staggering rental of 50% of the yield of the land. Again in theory the Agha has absolute discretion to evict any tenant he disapproves of, and similarly the tenant is free to leave whenever he chooses; the only property that the tenant possesses in his own right are ordinary household belongings, the roof beams of his house, and his personal livestock. Practise probably differs markedly from theory. So far as I could judge in the Balik country at any rate at least 90% of the population of any gund were not only Balik tribesmen but also members of the Agha's own taifa, many of them being his near kinsmen. It would seem then that the Agha's right of eviction remains theoretical except under extreme provocation. In practise the right of tenancy is heriditable. This latter point was confirmed to me by Sheikh Mohammad Agha of Walash; the way he put it was that when a tenant died he, the Agha, could do whatever he liked with the land, but that "as a rule" he gave it to the deceased's son or brother whichever was the most suitable. It may be noted that such a procedure would tend to prevent the land being split up into a vast number of small holdings by the process of inheritance, and would also provide an economic bond between the members of the smaller extended family groups.

614
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The tribal custom here is not, as might at first sight appear, at variance with Mohammedan law. According to the Koranic rule a man's testimentary rights are limited and most of his "property" (mulk) is passed on in defined proportions to certain specific relatives. Land however is for the most part excluded in the term mulk. The actual legal position as it applies to land tenure in Iraq is somewhat involved and the interested reader should refer direct to Sir E. Dowson's "An Inquiry into Land Tenure and Related Questions" (Iraq Government 1932). The following account summarises the position.

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The legal situation regarding the inheritance of land tenure is defined by the Ottoman Land Code of 1858, and certain subsidiary enactments of the old Turkish Empire. This recognises five classes of

"I have no data to show what rental is really paid. I was assured on several different occasions and in different contexts at Hamurdan, Walash and Dergala that the normal arrangement is for the Agha to receive half the gross yield of the land if the tenant provides his own cattle, implements, seed, etc., but two thirds of the gross yield if the Agha provides the seed, implements, etc. According to Hay (p. 68) the figure is only 10% of the yield. But as I shall show presently a 50% rental is probably not as excessive as it sounds.

[427]

being self sufficient in his production, trading only that which is surplus to his requirements. Under the new conditions the local production of cereals will be inadequate and the difference will have to be made up by trading tobacco for wheat. Thus for the first time the ordinary commoner will be forced to evaluate his basic foodstuffs in terms of a cash economy - and this may have serious consequences. Under present conditions tobacco is so enormously valuable (in terms of cash) compared with any other Kurdish production that some well favoured villages may come to rely on this crop to the exclusion of others, thus making the welfare of the community dependent upon fluctuations in the price of tobacco on the Baghdad market, - hardly a desirable development.

The social consequences of an increase in tobacco cultivation may be equally drastic. Consider for instance the matter of rents. In a previous section I have suggested that the commoner normally pays his Agha 50% of the yield of his land; and this is evidently no great hardship since the commoner family lives satisfactorily on the remaining 50%. Moreover in terms of cash the rental does not represent very much - at 1938 prices, a ton of wheat would purchase locally only just over 50 kilos of sugar. But under the new system not only will the commoner be unable to satisfy his own food requirements without resort to trade, but a 50% rental would, relatively speaking, be worth its weight in gold, - with the added consequence that the commoner who trades tobacco will for the first time find himself under a direct tax obligation to the Government. There is little doubt that in such circumstances 'rents' would be reduced. My view the general levelling up of financial status as between commoner and Agha which would result from this process would be entirely fatal to the existing tribal organisation.

On the analogy with the lowland areas the ultimate line of evolution is indeed clear. The Agha finds it increasingly difficult to maintain his obligations of kinship and hospitality; he falls into debt and eventually by some trick of the law the tribal land is mortgaged to pay the bill* thereafter the new Agha is merely a landlord with no personal ties with the community - the process of tribal dissolution may to all intents and purposes be regarded as complete.

From the Government's point of view such a development is not entirely undesirable. A completely detribalised community is in many respects easier to administer than a tribal one, at least in the short term view. And there are still wider factors affecting the situation. The labour for the Kirkuk oil fields is largely supplied

* This is theoretically impossible, since by Iraq definition tribal land is miri land. Nevertheless the process of alienation has in the past clearly taken place in the plains and foothill areas.

Where possible the driving water is obtained by diverting some main stream. This is done at Kangurban, Bayat and Berga and the operation of the mill then has no effect upon the irrigation system of the village. In Dergala however water supplies are less adequate. If the stream is diverted through the irrigation channels there is insufficient to drive the mill. A compromise has therefore been reached. The water is passed through the cultivation on average six hours per day and to the mill for the remaining eighteen. Some friction arises on this account and while I was in Dergala a young man got a good kicking from the Agha for cutting the dyke during the night so as to get an extra supply of water for his tobacco seedlings. Here again then is an obstacle that might prove confusing to any hastily thought out scheme of agricultural reform.

The owner of the mill is probably in most cases a near relative of the Agha. In Kangurban it is the Agha himself, in Dergala a father-in-law of the Agha. The terms are in effect that the owner of the wheat hires the mill at a fixed charge for each sack of corn ground. The man who owns the wheat himself operates the machinery. There is no suggestion of selling the corn to the miller. The millowner merely obtains a rental for the use of his apparatus. In this he is in competition with up-to-date apparatus in the towns, the latter being of course much quicker and producing a smoother and cleaner flour. In general however the trouble involved in carrying the wheat to Rowanduz and bringing the flour back again is sufficient to ensure that the Kangurban rentals with the local mill provided the price charged is not too high. In outlying districts at any rate the mill seems likely to remain a permanent institution.

Weaving

The only other piece of technical equipment I intend to discuss in this study is the cloth loom. The design of the apparatus is indicated in the diagram. It is nearly identical to the loom used elsewhere in Iraq, with the difference that the latter has the "heater lo" suspended from a rigid rectangular framework instead of freely hung from the roof as in the Kurdish example. This improvement permits the widening of the warp. Thus while the Kurdish loom has a maximum warp of about 16½ inches, an apparatus which I saw in Baghdad could carry a warp nearly three times as wide. Kurdish weavers do not apparently ever attempt complicated patterns, they always use a plain weave. Stripes are sometimes introduced by means of coloured threads in the warp. Qualities of cloth produced differ mainly in the thickness and density of the threads. Thus from specimens in my possession, the coarse brown cloth, normally used for the trouserings of commoners, has Warp 19; Weft 22 threads

The rug loom is quite a different piece of apparatus; it is not considered here since its social relevance seems insignificant.